What are the tradeoffs that the public is willing to accept between inflation and unemployment? We find that people dislike unemployment more than inflation. This is true for both Europe and Latin America. For the latter, the aversion to unemployment relative to inflation is much greater. Moreover, in both regions, the poor's distaste for unemployment relative to inflation is significantly greater than that of the rich. This result contributes to the literature on the costs of inflation and questions the commonly held view that prescribes strong anti-inflationary postures as a way to implement policies consistent with the preferences of the poor.
Introduction
When macroeconomists discuss the costs of inflation, they often claim that inflation is a tax, one that is especially high for the poor, who are unable to hedge against its consequences, unlike the more financially sophisticated rich. For instance, Mankiw (2006) claims that inflation "is not a tax on all assets but only on non-interest-bearing assets, such as cash. The rich are able to keep most of their wealth in forms that can avoid the inflation tax."
These arguments have been appropriated by Central Banks to justify (strong) antiinflationary policies. For instance, during a speech in 2017, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City President, Esther George, said she was "not as enthusiastic or encouraged as some when I see inflation moving higher," because "inflation is a tax and those least able to afford it generally suffer the most." Following a similar line, Benoît Coeuré, a member of the Executive Board of the ECB, argued in a speech in 2012 that "inflation is also particularly harmful to the poorest parts of the population," and added that "poorer households tend to hold a larger fraction of their financial wealth in cash, implying that both expected and unexpected increases in inflation make them even poorer." Such stances are also common among central banks in developing countries. The Central Bank of Colombia explains on its webpage that keeping inflation low and stable is important because "increasing inflation means a redistribution of income against the poor." Similarly, the Central Bank of Chile explains that "inflation tends to hurt those who have a greater proportion of their wealth in money, that is, the poorest."
While this narrative prescribes strong anti-inflationary postures as a way to implement policies consistent with the preferences of the poor, there is not much evidence in the literature supporting the view that the poor would actually choose stronger anti-inflationary policies than the rich. 2 Moreover, anti-inflationary policies often come at the cost of less economic activity and higher unemployment rates, and these side effects of contractionary monetary policies are not necessarily evenly spread across the income distribution. In fact, as Coibion et al. (2017) demonstrate, anti-inflationary shocks can have adverse effects on income distribution.
Thus, we have on the one hand an established narrative that justifies antiinflationary postures as necessary to protect the poor from the consequences of inflation, and, on the other, evidence showing that the side effects of these policies can have a particularly adverse impact on them. This suggests that preferences vis-à-vis inflation versus unemployment (a proxy of the side effects of monetary shocks) might also not be evenly distributed across income groups. To the extent of our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence in the literature studying these relative preferences across the income distribution. This is the area where our paper most contributes to our knowledge.
In our study, we use life satisfaction data a la Di Tella et al. (2001) and Wolfers (2003) to estimate aversions to inflation and unemployment. This literature has found that both inflation and unemployment negatively affect life satisfaction (Di Tella et al, 2001; Wolfers, 2003; Blanchflower 2007; De Roux and Hofstetter, 2014; and Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2009) . We corroborate that in Europe, people dislike both unemployment and inflation, but that their aversion to the former is greater (as in Blanchflower, 2007) . Moreover, we establish that this result is also present in Latin America, despite its history of high inflation. (By contrast, hyperinflation during the 1920's has been blamed for the strong anti-inflationary sentiment and institutions in Germany.) Interestingly, we find that the aversion to unemployment relative to inflation is much stronger in Latin America than in Europe. We propose hypotheses that might explain this result. One explanation might be that being unemployed in Europe is less costly for individuals than in Latin America, given that the former has better institutions for dealing with the consequences of being unemployed. A complementary reason might be that a history of higher inflation in Latin America resulted in informal and formal arrangements for coping with its consequences, making its costs less relevant than commonly thought. We provide examples of these in the text.
We then analyze these preferences along the income distribution. In particular, we study whether the poor and the rich (defined within countries and by years) exhibit different preferences for inflation and unemployment. This is the main objective of the paper. We highlight three findings. First, in both regions, both the poor and the rich dislike inflation and unemployment; second, the aversion to unemployment relative to inflation is higher in Latin America; third, and most importantly, we find that both within Europe and Latin America, the poor exhibit a higher aversion to unemployment relative to inflation than the rich.
This novel result, that the poor dislike unemployment relative to inflation more than the rich, could be useful for Central Banks for understanding the tradeoffs citizens are willing to accept vis-à-vis unemployment and inflation, and how these preferences move along the income distribution. The idea that a compassionate Central Bank should fight inflation strongly notwithstanding the consequences on unemployment is at odds with the preferences along the income distribution we uncover in this paper.
Why would the poor and the rich have different preferences toward inflation and unemployment? One possible explanation is that the effects of monetary policy have distributive consequences. Until recently, it was unclear in which direction monetary policy affected income distribution. For instance, Bernanke (2015) claimed that " [m] onetary policy is a blunt tool which certainly affects the distribution of income and wealth, although whether the net effect is to increase or reduce inequality is not clear." Nevertheless, a recent study by Coibion et al. (2017) using U.S. data concludes that "[c]ontractionary monetary policy systematically increases inequality in labor earnings, total income, consumption and total expenditures. Furthermore, monetary policy shocks account for a non-trivial component of the historical cyclical variation in income and consumption inequality." Finding that the poor dislike unemployment relative to inflation more than the rich-as we do in this paper-is consistent with monetary shocks having side effects that disproportionally hit the poor, as Coibion et al. (2017) find. It is also consistent with Jayadev (2006) who, using a consistent cross-country social survey, finds that the poor are less likely than the rich to prioritize combating inflation over unemployment.
A second possible explanation might be that the poor are hit harder by unemployment than the rich. A third reason of why the poor dislike unemployment relative to inflation more than the rich, might reflect that some costs of inflation could be more relevant for the rich, in particular, the costs related to the allocation of resources to long-run projects.
Our findings are also related to the literature studying the formation of preferences and its relation to income distribution. According to Bowles (1998) , the allocation rules "influence the process of human development, affecting personality, habits, tastes, identities, and values." Of course, this allocation rules can be related to income distribution. Palacios-Huerta and Santos (2004) find that the wealth distribution is an important determinant of economic agents' levels of risk aversion.
In our paper, we provide novel evidence that preferences along the income distribution are also different vis-à-vis the unemployment-inflation tradeoff.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical strategy and the data used; Section 3 reports and interprets the results; and Section 4 presents some robustness checks and further results. Section 5 concludes.
Empirical model and data
Our empirical strategy has three stages:
 Estimate country-year measures of life satisfaction (LS);  Estimate the effects of inflation and unemployment on the LS measures and the respective tradeoffs between inflation and unemployment.
 Estimate these effects and tradeoffs across income groups (rich and poor segments of the population, as defined below).
Country-Year Life satisfaction measures
The first stage focuses on obtaining country-year life satisfaction measures using surveys (described in detail below), inclusive of the following question: "In general terms, would you say that you are satisfied with your life? Would you say that you are: very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied?" The strategy for obtaining our country-year LS measures closely follows those proposed by Wolfers (2003) and Di Tella et al. (2001) . We first code the answers as follows: 1 = "not at all satisfied"; 2 = "not very satisfied"; 3 = "fairly satisfied"; and 4 = "very satisfied." For each country-year, we compute the following three life satisfaction measures.
 LS1: The average life satisfaction across individuals for each country-year.
 LS2: Following Wolfers (2003) and Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) , we run an ordered probit regression on a full set of dummy variables for each country-year. LS2 is the corresponding fixed effect. individual's self-reported wellbeing in terms of his or her micro characteristicsincome proxies, marital status, age, employment, education, and so forth. We then calculate the mean residual for each country and year. LS3 is the countryyear average residual.
Unemployment and Inflation aversion
For the baseline case, we estimate the following pooled regression (similar to that in Di Tella et al., 2001 and Wolfers, 2003) :
.
( 1) is one of the three life satisfaction measures for country i in year t, is a country fixed effect, is a year fixed effect, is the unemployment rate, is the inflation rate, and is the error term. Our parameters of interest, and , represent the effects of changes in unemployment and inflation on life satisfaction, respectively.
Countries
We employ data from Latin America and Europe using the country samples of life 3 There are more years with life satisfaction surveys in the Eurobarometer survey. However, the questions that we use to assess individuals' incomes was dropped after 2002.
Inflation
For Latin America, the data comes from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) and corresponds to the average annual change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Starting in 2007, the official inflation rate in Argentina has underreported the actual increase in the price level. Correspondingly, for 2008 onward, we use the data from the Billion Prices Project 4 (www.inflacionverdadera.com) to correct for the Argentine series (see Cavallo 2013) . For Europe, we use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the OECD. The descriptive statistics for inflation are reported in Table   A1 in the Appendix. 5
Unemployment
For Latin America, we take the figures from the ILO's Key Indicators of the Labor Market database. Unemployment data for European countries comes from the OECD Economic Outlook. The descriptive statistics for unemployment are also reported in Table A1 in the Appendix.
Income
We estimate equation (1) 
where is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when the surveyed individual owns asset j and zero if otherwise; is the inverse of the proportion of individuals that own asset j for each country and for each year. If one individual owns all five assets, his or her index adds up to 10; if he has none, it is zero.
Possessing a good that most people have for a given country-year adds less to his or her index than having one that is less common. With this index, we rank individuals at the country-year level and build subsamples of poor and rich individuals. In the robustness section, we propose alternative ways of ranking individuals along the income distribution, and show that the results are very similar.
Results

LS measures
We first estimate the three country-year life satisfaction measures described in the previous section. The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1 . Consistent with the literature, the measures are positively correlated. Moreover, in Table A2 in the Appendix, we report the results of the pooled first stage regressions a la Di Tella et al. (2001) ; the results are similar to the first-stage-country regressions used to estimate LS3, and are also in line with the estimates in the previous literature. 
Inflation and unemployment aversion
We estimate equation (1) for Latin America and for Europe separately. In each case, we begin with an estimation for the whole sample-that is, without yet considering divisions based on the income distribution. The dependent variables are the LS measures. We expect negative signs for the coefficients for unemployment (α) and inflation (β). The results are reported in Blanchflower, 2007) . Here, we find that this also holds for developing countries, many of which were plagued by inflation problems in the past, and some of which continue to struggle with them. Note that in any case, our sample of country-years in Latin
America does not include triple-digit (or higher) inflation rates like the one Venezuela is presently experiencing, or those experienced by Brazil, Peru, Argentina, Chile and Bolivia (among others) in the past. 7 We do, however, have a few country-years with inflation rates above 20%, and we will explore their role in our results in the next section.
As for the size of α/β, we find that, on average, it is 1.6 in Europe, which is very much in line with Blanchflower's (2007) one. It had moderate inflation rates (i.e., annual inflation between 15 and 30%) for over a quarter of a century-between the mid-70s and the late 90s. As of now, after more than 15 straight years of single digit inflation rates, it still has several mechanisms in place that illustrate how persistent the institutions for coping with the consequences of inflation can be: it has a constitutional ruling requiring that annual minimum wage adjustments be at least as large as the current inflation;
banks still offer inflation-adjusted interest rates to costumers for long-term loans The poorer mechanisms for caring for the unemployed in Latin America relative to Europe combined with Latin America's formal and informal mechanisms for dealing with the consequences of inflation shocks could partly explain its higher marginal rate of substitution between inflation and unemployment.
Unemployment, Inflation and the income distribution
What about the effects of inflation and unemployment on wellbeing across the income distribution? To address this question, we estimate Equation (1) for the lower and upper quintiles of the income distribution as defined in equation (2) above. The respective results are reported in Table 3 for Latin America and Table 5 for Europe.
In Latin America, the coefficients for unemployment and inflation have negative signs for both the upper and lower quintiles, indicating that, as we found for the whole sample, more inflation or more unemployment shifts the distribution of selfreported wellbeing to the left, for both the poor and the rich. There are, however, differences with the results using the whole sample. The coefficients for inflation for the poorest quintile lose statistical significance in two of the three cases, but remain strongly significant for the richest quintile. Accordingly, and contrary to the conventional wisdom, in Latin America, it is the rich rather than the poor who demonstrate strong anti-inflationary preferences. As for the coefficients for unemployment, the opposite holds: unemployment remains strongly significant for the poor, but loses statistical strength for the rich (where the significance currently stands at 10%). These results should, of course, reflect on the marginal rate of substitution between inflation and unemployment along the income distribution. For the richest quintile in Latin America reported in Table 3 , it remains the case that unemployment matters more than inflation: the average tradeoff for the rich is 2.6. Nevertheless, recall that this statistic was 4.6 for the whole sample. Thus, while the rich in Latin America value extra points of unemployment more than of inflation, the tradeoff for them of the one for the other is smaller than for society as a whole. This result suggests that for the poorest 20% of the income distribution, the aversion to unemployment relative to inflation should be greater. Indeed, that is what the results for the poorest quintile, reported in Table 3 , suggest. There, on average, the tradeoff is 6.7.
(Nevertheless, one should take the ratio figures with a grain of salt when the coefficients are not statistically significant-i.e., the first two columns of the poorest quintile).
To further grasp the implications of these results, we calculate the tradeoff for the poor relative to that for the rich, α/β poor α/β rich , for each LS measure. This statistic gives us a sense on how much more the poor dislike unemployment relative to inflation than the rich. The statistics are reported in Table 4 . The results show that depending on which LS we focus on, the figures vary between 2.1 and 2.9, with an average of 2.5:
in Latin America, the poor's marginal rate of substitution between inflation and unemployment is, on average, two-and-a-half times greater than that for the rich. Summing up the results for Latin America along the income distribution: first, both the unemployment rate and the inflation rate have a negative impact on selfreported satisfaction levels. Second, unemployment has a greater impact than inflation. Third, while both the rich and the poor value unemployment more than inflation, the poor's substitution rate is higher: their tradeoff parameter is, on average, 2.5 times greater than that for the rich.
In Table 5 , we report the regressions for Europe. Again, as with Latin America, all coefficients of interest have the expected negative signs. Unlike what is the case for Latin America, they are all statistically relevant for the rich and the poor, except for unemployment for LS3 for the richest quintile. As for the marginal rate of substitution between inflation and unemployment, it is 1.7 for the poor-i.e., as we found in Latin America, the poor care more about unemployment than inflation. For the rich in Europe, the average marginal rate of substitution is very close to one, implying that one extra point of inflation matters almost as much as one extra point of unemployment. We have again the case then, as in Latin America, that the poor dislike unemployment relative to inflation more than the rich. In Table 6 , we report the ratio between the relative aversions for the poor and the rich. We find that the tradeoff between unemployment and inflation is, on average, 1.9 times greater for the poorest quintile compared to the richest. Why would the poor in both Latin America and Europe care more about unemployment relative to inflation than the rich? One reason might be that they are hit harder by unemployment than the rich. OECD data for 2015 (inclusive of three countries in Latin America) shows that the average unemployment rate for people with a tertiary education (a proxy for "the rich") was 4.8%. The same statistic for people with less than a secondary education ("the poor") was 12.5%. It could be then that since the poor are hit hardest by unemployment, they dislike it more than the rich.
Another reason why the poor dislike unemployment relative to inflation more than the rich might reflect the costs of inflation. Textbook macroeconomics holds that one cost of inflation is its impact on savings' decisions: with higher (or more variable) inflation, the allocation of resources to long-run projects becomes more difficult.
Since the poor tend to have less resources for savings (IDB, 2016) , this cost might be more relevant for the rich than for the poor.
Finally, as Coibion et al. (2017) show, the adverse side effects of anti-inflationary monetary shocks tend to fall disproportionally on the poor. Taken together, these three elements might explain the patterns deduced in this section. Future research is needed, both theoretical and empirical, to shed light on the validity of the hypotheses here outlined.
Robustness and further results:
High inflation
One possible concern is the impact the country-year observations with high inflation rates-especially in the Latin American sample-might have on our results. While the average inflation rates across the country-years we use are in single digits both in Latin America (8.3%) and Europe (5.7%), there are a few observations of high inflation (see Table A1 in the appendix for the descriptive statistics). In particular,
for Latin America, we have 19 country-years with inflation rates above 20%, the highest of which is for Ecuador, where inflation was at 96% in 2000 (prior to its dollarization); and twelve where the rate of inflation was between 20 and 30%. For
Europe, we have 8 observations of inflation rates between 20 and 30%, though none above that. While Wolfers (2003) has shown that the relationship between LS and inflation seems to be linear in OECD countries, it's still worth checking whether these observations play a role in our sample and whether they are relevant when studying preferences along the income distribution.
We drop from our estimation all country-years with inflation rates above 20%. We choose the 20% peak to match the one proposed by Ball (1994) to study the outputinflation tradeoff. In results that are not reported here, we tried other peaks (25%, 30% and 40%) and the conclusions discussed below were similar. We thus discard 19 observations for Latin America and 8 for Europe and estimate the three models (for all individuals and upper & lower quintiles). We report the estimates in Table 7 .
For Europe, the results are very similar to the ones in the previous section. All coefficients are negative and unemployment weighs heavier than inflation in preferences (by a factor of 1.4 for the entire sample of individuals). When splitting the sample across income quintiles, we again find that the weight placed on unemployment relative to inflation is greater for the poor than for the rich (on average, 1.5 versus 0.7, respectively).
For Latin America, in contrast with the findings in the previous section, in Table 7 inflation is not statistically significant: once we remove the high inflation observations in our sample, the statistical relevance of inflation vanishes.
Unemployment remains relevant, but more so for the rich than for the poor. In all cases, we obtain negative coefficients.
Given that inflation is not statistically relevant, we should be cautious about interpreting the relative tradeoff between inflation and unemployment (α/β), as we cannot reject the hypothesis that the denominator is zero. In any case, we obtain that the tradeoff between unemployment and inflation are higher on average (close to 10)-, that is, one extra point of unemployment affects wellbeing as much as 10 additional points of inflation. On average the poor put more weight than the rich on unemployment relative to inflation except with LS3. 
Other measures of income distribution-Latin America
In our baseline estimation, we used the question in the Latinobarometro surveys about assets owned by households to build an index (G, running from 0 to 10), in order to split the sample into rich and poor quintiles at the country-year level. There is another question in the Latinobarometro surveys that can be used as a proxy for income. In particular, the surveys record the interviewer's perception about the relative income position of the individuals surveyed. The interviewer chooses from the following five categories: "very bad"; "bad"; "average"; "good"; and "very good". We code this perception from zero to 10 and label the resulting index as I.
We then estimate models separating rich and poor quintiles using H, a weighted average of the two measures, G and I, for different weights λ (between 0 and 1):
Thus, if λ is 1, we are back at the baseline case; if it equals zero, all of the weight is on the inteviewer's perception.
We summarize the results in Figure 1 , which depicts the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment (α/β) for each LS measure and quintile along different values of λ. The three subplots convey the same message: the poor's aversion to unemployment relative to inflation is higher than that of the rich no matter the value of λ-that is, regardless of whether we distribute the population into rich and poor categories using the assets approach adopted in the previous section; based on interviewers' perceptions; or a combination of the two.
Quartiles
Finally, we also estimate the main regressions if, instead of using quintiles to split the population into rich and poor, we use quartiles. The results are reported in Table   8 . We identify the same general patterns in these estimates. The coefficients are always negative, and in each region, respective poor quartiles are more concerned about unemployment than inflation relative to the rich. 
Conclusions
Central Banks around the world, both in industrialized and developing countries, use monetary policy to fight inflation. Many of them also have other goals and are concerned about the side effects fighting inflation might have on, for instance, economic activity or unemployment. Balancing social preferences for low inflation with those for low unemployment has been at the heart of discussions in the literature and in policymaking. Starting with Di Tella et al., (2001) , economists have relied on life satisfaction surveys to address questions regarding the impact each of these variables has on wellbeing. We contribute to this literature by studying how much people dislike unemployment and inflation, both in Europe and in Latin America, and particularly by analyzing whether there are differences in preferences between the two along the income distribution.
We corroborate that in Europe, extra points of inflation or unemployment diminish wellbeing, (e.g., Di Tella et al. (2001) and Wolfers (2003) , among others). We establish that this finding is also present in Latin America. More importantly, we find that the aversion to unemployment is higher than that for inflation. While this is true in both regions, the size of the tradeoff is much larger in Latin America. This is an important result for Central Banks in the region, and might surprise observers, given that Latin America has had a history of recurrently flirting with high inflation rates. What comes out of our baseline results is that an extra point of unemployment has the same effect as more than 4 extra points of inflation on wellbeing.
Why is this tradeoff much greater in Latin America than in Europe? We hint at two explanations in the paper. On the one hand, Europe has generous unemployment insurance programs that mitigate the consequences of unemployment on wellbeing.
Unemployment insurance is almost non-existent in Latin America. On the other hand, recurrent inflation episodes in the past led Latin-Americans to build institutions-formal and informal-that mitigate many of the costs of inflation shocks. These institutions have remained in place even in countries that achieved low and stable inflation rates some time ago. Thus, people in Latin America are better prepared for inflation shocks, while those in Europe have better institutions for dealing with the consequences of unemployment.
As for how these preferences change along the income distribution, we find-both for Europe and Latin America-that the poor's distaste for unemployment relative to inflation is much higher than the rich's. This finding is at odds with the commonly held view by Central Banks that hawkish monetary policies line up with the poor's preferences.
In the paper, we outlined three hypotheses that could explain why the poor care more about unemployment relative to inflation than the rich. One may be related to the costs of inflation. Textbook macroeconomics holds that one of the costs of inflation is its impact on decisions requiring long-term planning, such as savings and investment. Since the poor tend to have fewer resources for saving and investment, this cost might be more relevant to the rich than the poor. A second hypothesis is that the poor may care more about unemployment simply because they are hit harder by unemployment than the rich. OECD data shows that, in 2015, the average unemployment rate for people with a tertiary education ("the rich") was 4.8%, while for individuals with less than a secondary education ("the poor"), it was 12.5%. Finally, it could simply be that the side effects of anti-inflationary monetary shocks have adverse distributive consequences (Coibion et al., 2017) . Whatever the merit of each of these explanations, the results send an important message to Central Bankers: preferences for unemployment vis-a-vis inflation are not evenly distributed along the income distribution.
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